Abstract. In Eurocrypt'98, Okamoto and Uchiyama presented a publickey cryptosystem as secure as factoring n = p 2 q; in terms of decryption complexity, the scheme is basically equivalent to RSA and requires O(log 3 n) bit operations. In this note we point-out that a slight morphological modification in the scheme's structure that lower the decryption complexity to O(log 2 n) while preserving equivalence to factoring.
Okamoto-Uchiyama's Cryptosystem
In Eurocrypt'98, Okamoto and Uchiyama proposed a new public-key cryptosystem (OU) based on the ability of computing discrete logarithms in a particular subgroup. Namely, if p is a large prime and γ p ⊂ Z * p 2 is
then γ p has a group structure with respect to the multiplication modulo p 2 and ♯γ p = p. The function log(.) : γ p −→ Z p which associates (x − 1)/p to x is clearly well-defined on γ p and presents interesting homomorphic properties. In particular, ∀x, y ∈ γ p log(xy mod p 2 ) = log(x) + log(y) mod p whereby, as a straightforward generalization,
Key Setup. Generate two k-bit primes p and q (typically 3k = 1023) and set n = p 2 q. Randomly select and publish a number g < n such that
is of order p in Z * p 2 and keep g p secret (note that g p ∈ γ p ). Similarly, choose g ′ < n at random and publish
The triple {n, g, h} forms the public key. The secret key is {p, q}.
Encryption. Pick r < n uniformly at random and encrypt the (k −
Decryption. Proceed as follows:
We refer the reader to [1] for a thorough description of the scheme. Although provably equivalent to factoring [2] as far as chosen-plaintext attacks are concerned, the scheme suffers from the fact that ciphertexts are about three times longer than plaintexts. Note that step 1 of the decryption process requires O(k 3 ) bit operations.
The Proposed Variant
As pointed-out by Paillier [3] OU's trapdoor is inherently new in the sense that it profoundly differs from RSA and Diffie-Hellman. It makes no doubt that this technique could be declined in various ways for designing new public-key cryptosystems in near future.
In order to reduce OU's complexity to O(k 2 ) while preserving equivalence to factoring, we select a p such that p − 1 has a large (160-bit) prime factor t, let p − 1 = tu and modify the scheme's specifications as follows:
Randomly select a number g < n such that
is of order p in Z * p 2 , compute G = g u mod n and keep g p secret. Similarly, choose g ′ < n at random and publish
